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Spatial Polarisation of Presidential Voting in the United States, 1992-2012:  
the ‘Big Sort’ Revisited. 
 
 
 
 
Much has been written in recent years about the claimed polarisation of the US 
electorate, with substantial differences as to whether there has been greater spatial 
polarisation, at several geographical scales, over recent decades. To assess the 
veracity of those alternative views, a bespoke data set showing percentage support for 
the Democratic Party’s presidential candidates at the County, State and Divisional 
scales has been analysed using a robust, statistically-based measure of 
polarisation/segregation. The ecological results provide clear and compelling 
evidence of a trend towards greater polarisation across the nine Census Divisions, 
across the 49 States within those Divisions, and across the 3077 Counties within the 
States – with strong evidence that the differences over time at the last of those scales 
are highly statistically significant. Within those general trends, polarisation has been 
greater in some States than others and also within some States more than others – 
identifying additional geographies calling for further research. 
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Introduction 
 
Much has been written in recent years about the claimed polarisation of the US 
electorate. This has two, largely separate, components. The first is ideological polarisation, 
with claims that individuals are becoming more polarised in their attitudes on a range of 
economic, social and cultural issues, changes that are reflected in their support for the two 
main political parties. The second is spatial polarisation, which focuses on the geography of 
support for those parties – and which is the main focus of the present paper. Spatial 
polarisation – the growing concentration of support for the Democratic Party in some parts of 
the United States and for the Republican Party in others – can be independent of ideological 
polarisation (on which latter there is much debate: see Fiorina et al., 2008a, 2008b; Layman 
et al., 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Levendusky, 2009a). The geography of 
support can change without any alteration to any underpinning ideological differences 
between supporters of the two parties. But is that geography changing? This paper addresses 
that question only, seeking to establish more firmly than in other studies whether that is the 
case and, if so, to establish a research agenda exploring the processes that have brought the 
changes about. An empirical claim has been made; we evaluate its veracity as a preface to 
further research on why there have been major recent changes to the county’s macro- and 
meso-scale electoral geographies. 
 
Spatial Polarisation: the ‘Big Sort’ 
 
Recent arguments regarding spatial polarisation were stimulated by the publication of 
Bishop and Cushing’s (2008) The Big Sort, which claimed that ‘Over the past thirty years, the 
United States has been sorting itself, sifting at the most microscopic levels of society … 
Between 4 and 5 percent of the population moves each year from one County to another – 
100 million Americans in the past decade’ (p.5). These moves necessarily involve decisions 
2 
 
not only about impersonal characteristics of the destinations being considered but also about 
the nature of potential neighbours, with the claim that ‘Those are now political decisions, and 
they are having a profound effect on the nation’s public life’. People are choosing, it is 
claimed, to move to neighbourhoods with whose residents they share many features of their 
lifestyles, and these are reflected in their political choices – at their most basic, whether they 
vote Democrat or Republican. People have not been explicitly deciding where to live on the 
basis of their potential neighbours’ electoral pre-dispositions, but the massive volumes of 
migration have involved movers being increasingly careful to select neighbourhoods 
dominated by households and families like themselves. This in turn has meant growing socio-
economic-cultural segregation, which in its turn has resulted in greater political polarisation.1 
 
Bishop and Cushing’s (2008) portrayal of the geography of that increased polarisation 
– the outcome of the assumed processes – was based on neither extensive nor intensive 
statistical analysis. At its core was a single comparison of voting Democrat or Republican at 
two presidential elections (1976 and 2004), at the County scale. Each County was classified 
into whether or not it was won by a landslide at the relevant election – defined as whether one 
party’s candidate defeated the other’s by 20 percentage points or more. The percentage of 
voters living in such ‘landslide Counties’ increased from 26.8 at the first date to 48.3 at the 
second, which Bishop and Cushing (2008, 10-11) interpreted as an ‘increasing polarisation of 
American communities’ culminating with just under half of the electorate living in places 
where there was, in effect, no contest. (The Afterword – pp.305-310 – in the 2009 edition of 
the book found no change at the 2008 election.) 
 
Because of unequally-sized electorates across Counties, however, this comparison 
understated what was shown on their maps: at the 1976 election, 38 per cent of the Counties 
had ‘landslides’, whereas in 2004 more than 60 per cent did – not surprisingly the larger 
(mostly metropolitan) Counties were more heterogeneous and less likely to produce a 
landslide victory for either candidate. Both elections (Carter versus Ford in 1976, and Kerry 
versus Bush in 2004) were close nationally, giving strength to their argument that residential 
sorting over those three decades was responsible for the greater polarisation. At the County 
scale, urban areas were becoming less polarised than rural areas, however, which 
undoubtedly accounts for their further finding that ‘Republican Counties tended to become 
more politically segregated than Democratic Counties’ (p.44; see also Scala et al., 2015). 
 
Apart from data on the number of ‘landslide Counties’, Bishop and Cushing’s 
analysis – characteristic of most journalism – focused on anecdotal and qualitative rather than 
rigorous quantitative evidence to sustain their case. They did, however, report some analyses 
of census and polling data, finding that when comparing ‘strongly partisan’ Republican and 
Democratic Counties the former had: more married people; more high earners; more white 
residents; and more people who went to church weekly and identified as Evangelicals (pp.47-
48). Further comparisons of County data across four censuses (1970-2000) found that 
strongly Democratic Counties had greater increases in the percentages of their populations 
with degrees and who were foreign born than strongly Republican Counties; the latter, on the 
other hand, gained more church members and white residents than their strongly Democratic 
counterparts. 
 
Critique 
 
The Big Sort has attracted a range of critiques. Abrams and Fiorina (2012), for example, 
identified major shortcomings in both its portrayal of polarisation and the processes adduced 
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to account for the observed patterns. With regard to the portrayal, their criticisms drew 
attention to Bishop and Cushing’s: 
 use of Presidential election voting data, rather than voting for candidates at State or 
Congressional elections, ‘to avoid the effects of different candidates or changing 
voting districts’ (Bishop and Cushing, 2008, 9): Abrams and Fiorina (2012, 203)  
argued instead that ‘far from minimizing the effects of different candidates, reliance 
on presidential voting returns maximizes the effect of different candidates’ and may 
not reflect local attitudes more generally – as in Montana in 2004, won by George W. 
Bush in the presidential contest but by the Democratic candidate in the concurrent 
gubernatorial election; 
 use of data for two elections only – 1976 and 2004 – as evidence of greater 
polarisation, on the well-established grounds that choice of the start- and end-dates for 
a period can considerably impact on the observed trends (on which see Taylor, 1988); 
and 
 use of information on the number of ‘landslide County’ wins (by a margin of twenty 
percentage points or more) as their indicator of growing polarisation: using other 
measures, they show that ‘Counties in the United States have become increasingly 
politically heterogeneous, not increasingly homogeneous’ (Abrams and Fiorina, 2012, 
205). 
Abrams and Fiorina (2012, 205-206) are cautious in their conclusions, however: 
Do the preceding analyses prove that political residential segregation is not occurring? 
No. That is not our position. We are simply pointing out that Bishop’s sweeping 
argument about geographical political sorting has little or no empirical foundation.  
 
They reiterated this position in another paper (Fiorina and Adams, 2008, 576), citing 
Klinkner and Hapanowicz’s (2005, 5) conclusion that ‘While there might be a slight increase 
in political segregation, it is still in line with historical trends and is not anything unexpected’ 
and another by Nunn and Evans (2006) which found ‘increased spatial polarization of party 
identification, liberal-conservative ideology, and confidence in government institutions, but 
perhaps surprisingly, in view of Bishop’s argument, not in voting behavior’ (Fiorina and 
Abrams, 2008, 576). Similarly, looking at long-term trends up to 2004, Glaeser and Ward 
(2006) rejected five ‘myths’ about US electoral behaviour, among them that the two parties 
have become geographically more segregated and that political divisions are growing. 
Certainly their data for the period 1860-1976 show little more than trendless fluctuation, but 
the index of dissimilarity between the distribution of Democrat and Republican votes (their 
Figure 2) indicates a substantial and steady increase from 1976 on – by 2004 it had almost 
doubled. Because of their focus on the long-term, this aspect of their findings is not 
commented upon, nor taken into account in their conclusion that ‘Democrats and Republicans 
are not more geographically segregated in the past’ (Glaeser and Ward, 2006, 33). If they had 
been focusing on recent decades, they may have concluded otherwise – that Bishop and 
Cushing, who did focus on recent decades only, were right! 
 
The current paper explores whether an alternative approach can provide a rigorous 
empirical foundation to the case for greater polarization, given that other analyses have 
sustained the Bishop-Cushing argument. Myers (2013, 59), for example, succinctly 
concluded his spatial analysis of 150 Texan Voter Tabulation Districts that: ‘between 1996 
and 2010, the geographical bases of the political parties in Texas have continuously diverged 
… [as] a result of progressively higher-than-average changes in Republican partisanship 
across broad but lightly-populated swaths of east and central Texas, as well as by 
progressively lower-than-average changes in Republican partisanship in the most urban parts 
4 
 
of the state’ – patterns that he believes characterise other southern States (e.g. McKee, 2008). 
Focused more directly on the The Big Sort’s argument, Sussell (2013) similarly found that 
Californian voter registration data indicated growing polarisation at the census block and tract 
plus County scales, and Kinsella et al. (2015) provided comparable evidence using micro-
scale data for a single city – Cincinnati; across the country, Morrill et al. (2011) found 
increased polarisation at the county scale between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas 
between the 2004-2008 presidential elections.  
 
Regarding the role of selective migration as a source of such sorting, Cho et al. (2013, 
866) showed ‘not only that the relocation patterns of a significant subset of the population 
exhibit geographic sorting by a number of neighbourhood characteristics … [but additionally 
that] partisanship is also considered in selecting a relocation destination’ (see also Gimpel 
and Hui, 2015, and McDonald, 2011, but also Nall and Mummolo, 2013). Wing and Walker 
(2010) analysed the degree of spatial polarisation at one election and spatial scale only, and 
associated this with the clustering of like-minded people, but the conclusion – p. 282 – that 
their hypothesis that ‘polarization of the U.S. electorate has occurred over space and is 
attributable to a process of local entrenchment, whereby a variety of social forces amplify 
county populations’ propensity to vote Republican or Democratic’ is sustained by inferring 
change from a single cross-sectional study only. 
 
This paper only addresses the first of the two main components of Bishop and 
Cushing’s argument, that there has been spatial polarisation in voting at US presidential 
elections over recent decades. This is an empirical question and, as detailed below, is 
addressed using a newly-developed analytical procedure designed explicitly to measure the 
degree of polarisation/segregation in spatial patterns at a nested range of scales. If the 
hypothesis of greater polarisation is sustained, then future work will need to address the 
second component of their argument – that the increased polarisation has resulted from 
selective migration. The final section of the paper suggests directions for such research, 
including alternative hypotheses. 
 
The research reported here is not, therefore, concerned with patterns of individual 
behaviour, nor does it make inferences about that behaviour. The argument addressed – and 
expressed as a formal research question/hypothesis in the next section – is that a very large 
number of individual behavioural decisions combine to result in an altered aggregate pattern. 
Our concern here is whether that pattern exists. If it does, questions are posed regarding the 
suggested reason for its emergence. 
 
Data and Method 
 
Of Abrams and Fiorina’s three major criticisms of the empirical base for the spatial 
trends ‘assumed’ by Bishop and Cushing, two can be substantially countered. To address the 
arbitrary nature of start- and end-points, instead of comparing two years only we use a time 
series, comprising data for not only the start- and end-points but for all intermediate years, in 
this case those with presidential elections. (Details of the data set are outlined in Appendix 1.) 
The arbitrariness of the choice of the two end-points remains valid (although 2012 is the last 
for which data are available), but if a clear trend can be identified over the period then a 
claim for greater polarisation has a much firmer foundation. Secondly, we use as our basic 
measure the percentage voting Democrat in each County at each presidential election (where 
the denominator is [Democrats + Republican] following the argument in Gelman – 2008 – 
that it is less affected than total votes cast by excluding support for third and other parties, 
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especially Perot2). While support for the Democratic Party’s candidates both waxed and 
waned during the period analysed here (1992-2012) this does not impact on our chosen 
measure of polarisation (introduced below) which focuses on variance (around the overall 
level of support at any one date) rather than any absolute measure of difference. 
 
Regarding Abrams and Fiorina’s third criticism, we accept that presidential voting 
may not reflect other aspects of political attitudes held by a County’s residents, and thus the 
picture we provide is partial only – as would be any other. The advantage of using this 
measure of the electoral character of an area’s population is that it is universal; all Counties 
participate in the election and the two main parties contested all States at each election. 
House of Representatives elections are more frequent, but a substantial number of 
Congressional Districts are uncontested, and not every State requires, and thus publishes data 
on, voter registration. It may be that electors vote very differently across separate State and 
County (and other) contests held on the same day (the well-known phenomenon of ‘split-
ticket voting’: Burden and Kimball, 2004), but that does not necessarily mean that the pattern 
of voting for the presidential party is an ‘anomaly’; voting for another office at State or 
County level may reflect local issues or candidatures and hence be the ‘anomaly’, for 
example. Voting for the president is comparable over both place and time and is thus the 
chosen focus for the current analysis.  
 
The basic question addressed here is: 
Did spatial polarisation in voting for president increase across the United States 
between 1992 and 2012, inclusive? 
However, we do not address it at a single scale. Many analyses have used the State as the 
basic spatial unit (e.g. Gelman, 2008) and found clear evidence of polarisation (as did 
Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008); similar trends can be found at coarser scales. This is 
clearly indicated by the descriptive data in Table 1, which shows variations over time in the 
number of votes cast for the Democratic Party candidate (Clinton in 1992 and 1996; Gore in 
2000; Kerry in 2004; and Obama in 2008 and 2012) as a percentage of the total votes cast for 
the Republican and Democratic Party candidates combined. The data refer to all Counties (or 
County-equivalents: see Appendix 1) in 49 States in the nine Census Divisions (with Alaska 
and the District of Columbia excluded because they are not divided into County or ‘County-
equivalent’ districts). 
 
There are very consistent trends for four of the parameters of those distributions over 
the six elections at each of the three scales. The minimum percentage voting Democrat fell 
(to just one-third of its 1992 figure by 2012 at the County scale), and the maximum increased, 
resulting in a greater range of values. The means varied, reflecting the relative popularity of 
the two parties; the Democrats performed best, at each scale, in the four elections won by 
Clinton and Obama, and worst in those won by G. W. Bush for the Republicans. But the 
standard deviations increased over time – more than doubling at the Divisional scale – as did 
the coefficients of variation (the standard deviation expressed as a percentage of the mean).  
 
These descriptive data clearly suggest that there was spatial polarisation in support for 
Democratic Party candidates for the US presidency over the 1992-2012 period, at each of 
three spatial scales. But, as was early recognised in studies of spatial segregation (Duncan et 
al., 1961), any measure of segregation at one scale necessarily incorporates – to an unknown 
extent – segregation at a higher scale. (This argument is generalised and stressed by Tranmer 
and Steel, 2001.) Thus, for example, if there is increased segregation at the State scale this 
will necessarily be observed also at the County scale when it is measured across all States. By 
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measuring segregation separately at both scales, however, its relative importance at each 
cannot be determined – the intensity of segregation at the State scale is included in the 
measure for the County scale. We need a method that takes this multi-scalar nature of the 
segregating process into account in order to address the expanded version of our research 
question: 
Did spatial polarisation in voting for president increase across the United States 
between 1992 and 2012, inclusive, independently at each of three scales – County, 
State and Census Division? 
 
As with any analysis using aggregate data for spatial units, the Modifiable Areal Unit 
Problem (MAUP; see Manley, 2014) issue can be raised. Clearly this division of the United 
States into 3,077 Counties, nested within 49 States, nested within 9 Census Divisions is only 
one of a very large number of possible realisations wherein the tens of millions of US voters 
at the six elections studied could be organised – and it may be that for some of the potential 
other realisations different patterns might be observed. One clear defence of our approach is 
the pragmatic one that these are the data that exist and, as in so many studies of large 
population aggregates, researchers have little alternative but to accept the limitations of what 
is available: such research is necessarily constrained by what is possible. The smallest spatial 
units – the Counties (and County-equivalents) – are fixed and though it would certainly be 
very desirable to use smaller units, perhaps more akin to the districts and neighbourhoods that 
are used by individuals and households when making residential-location decisions – as in 
the localised studies by Kinsella et al. (2015), Myers (2013), and Sussell (2013) – such data 
are not available on a national scale. In seeking to establish the existence of nation-wide 
patterns, therefore, data availability precludes the exploration of micro-scale patterns 
alongside those at the macro- and meso-scales undertaken here. 
 
There is, however, a further defence for using the County within State within Division 
nested hierarchy of areas deployed here. The former two sets of spatial units are not arbitrary 
divisions of the country when it comes to the study of election results. They are important 
parts of the spatial matrix within which elections are organised, not least by the political 
parties and their candidates’ campaigning organisations; studying the pattern of voting within 
those units is thus doing so within the spatial structure of the elections themselves. Further, 
the Census Divisions are also not arbitrary divisions of the country: as Elazar’s (1984) classic 
study shows, they reflect the country’s historical geography, including its differing politico-
cultural ideologies. Whilst accepting arguments regarding the MAUP and the provisional 
nature of any analyses conducted using data for a single spatial realisation only, therefore, the 
framework within which those here were conducted and are reported is a realistic one for 
testing the research question set out above. In short our focus of interest is the changing 
degree of segregation for a fixed, unchanging meaningful spatial classification (Counties and 
States), as the areas have not been fundamentally been modified or re-zoned over the time 
period studied.   
 
 
The Measurement of Polarisation/Segregation 
 
We measure polarisation here as segregation. There is a very large literature on this – 
particularly with regard to residential patterns, especially of ethnic groups – using a wide 
range of indices, many of which, such as the well-known indices of dissimilarity and 
segregation, are in effect measures of variance at a particular spatial scale (Leckie et al., 
2012).  
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Several studies of residential segregation have identified its multi-scalar nature (e.g. 
Fowler, 2015) and explored both measures of spatial decomposition for particular indices 
(Reardon et al., 2000; Voas and Williamson, 2000; Johnston et al., 2003; Fischer et al., 2004; 
Parisi et al., 2011) and ways of mapping/measuring segregation at different scales (Lee at al., 
2008; Reardon et al., 2008, 2009; Östh et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2015). All have added 
substantially to our appreciation of segregation patterns – and, in some cases, to the 
underlying processes – but suffer from two disadvantages. First, their measures are 
descriptive only; they lack any inferential basis, and so provide no formal evaluation of 
whether one index value is larger than another. Secondly, they do not take into account 
Duncan et al.’s (1961) important argument that any measure of segregation at a particular 
scale – that of the County, say – must also incorporate that of any larger area in which those 
Counties are nested – such as States in the US context. 
 
Precise measurement of the degree of segregation/polarisation must therefore 
formally explore its multiscalar nature; the degree of segregation expressed at any one scale 
should be nett of its intensity at any coarser scales. A method for doing this, based in 
multilevel modelling procedures with Bayesian statistical properties, has recently been 
developed (Jones et al., 2015; Manley et al., 2015a, 2015b; Johnston et al., 2016). Its index of 
segregation – the Median Rate Ratio (MRR) – shows its level at each scale net of the larger 
scales within which the smallest observation units are nested. Those MRRs have associated 
asymmetric Bayesian credible intervals (CIs), with which assessments of the robustness of 
differences between pairs of values can be made.3  
 
Studies of ethnic residential segregation employing the MRR to date have reported 
analyses of multi-group situations (Jones et al., 2015, Manley et al., 2015a, 2015b); they 
compare the distributions of more than two ethnic or occupational groups in the cities 
analysed and the formal modelling treats their distribution as the outcome of a Poisson 
process. For the current study of polarisation we are dealing with binary categorisations – 
Democrat and Republican voters – and so the modelling assumes that their distributions are 
the outcome of a Binomial process. The relevant output from this is not the MRR, therefore, 
but rather the Median Odds Ratio (MOR: Larsen and Merlo, 2005). The modelling produces 
an estimated MOR for each election year, at each scale; it is a measure of polarisation at that 
scale, net of any polarisation at the next highest scale and net of Binomial variation 
occasioned by a varying denominator. 
 
MOR values are interpreted in the same way as odds ratios obtained from binary 
logistic regressions – they are a measure of the average (median) difference between two 
values; an odds ratio of 1.40, for example, indicates that one value is 40 per cent larger than 
the other. MORs are, as the use of the term Median in the title indicates, a summary of all of 
the possible odds ratios. For example, take one Census Division. For each of its constituent 
States, the modelling for election year x produces an estimate of the Democratic vote 
percentage. Odds ratios can then be calculated as the ratio between the highest and lowest 
modelled percentages for two States selected at random from within that Division. The 
median of all those possible ratios is thus the average value; it is a statement of the average 
(median) difference between the estimated ratios between States within that Division, and the 
MOR is the average difference between States within each Division across all Divisions. The 
larger the MOR, therefore, the greater the average difference between the modelled 
Democratic vote percentages within States in that year. 
 
8 
 
As the MOR is an average, the distribution from which it is drawn has other 
parameters, and the variance can be used to derive Credible Intervals (CIs) for each estimated 
MOR value. CIs are interpreted in the same way as confidence intervals in classic inferential 
statistics except that, as they are based on Bayesian models, they are potentially 
asymmetrical. The CIs enclosing 95 per cent of all estimated values are reported along with 
each MOR here, and used to assess whether any one MOR value is significantly different 
from another (at the 0.05 probability or better) – which can be determined by whether the two 
sets of CIs overlap. 
 
We apply this method (full details of which are in Jones et al., 2015) to a bespoke data 
set giving the percentage of the votes for the Democrat and Republican candidates that were 
cast for the former at each presidential election from 1992 to 2012, inclusive, for 3,077 
Counties (or the equivalent unit), nested within the forty-nine States and the nine Census 
Divisions.4 (Alaska and the District of Columbia are excluded because they lack any finer-
scale units.) The goal is to establish whether there were statistically significant changes in the 
level of polarisation at each of those scales over the period and, if so, to essay possible 
explanations for them. 
 
Polarisation in Voting Democrat, 1992-2012  
 
Figure 1 shows the trend in the MOR values at each of the three scales over the six 
elections, together with the associated CIs, and the full details of the modelled values are in 
Table 2. 
 
The dominant conclusion to be drawn from the figure and the associated data is that 
there is very clear and strong evidence of growing, and substantial, polarisation in the 
geography of the percentage voting Democrat at all three scales. At the Divisional scale, the 
MOR increased over the two decades from 1.20 to 1.55 (i.e. by 29 per cent); at the State 
scale, the increase – net of the increased polarisation at the Divisional scale – was less (from 
1.21 to 1.36 – an increase of 12 per cent); and at the County scale there was a 14 per cent 
increase. At each election, polarisation was greatest at the County scale and – after 1992 – 
least at the State scale. Nevertheless, the MOR at the latter scale for 2012 indicates that 
between States within Divisions on average the percentage voting Democrat in one was 36 
per cent larger than in another; at the County scale, between Counties within States the 
median percentage voting Democrat in one was 69 per cent greater than in another. 
 
The CIs are, unsurprisingly given the differing numbers of observations, widest at the 
Divisional and narrowest at the County scale. With the former, therefore, it cannot be 
concluded that there was a statistically significant increase in the degree of polarisation 
between each pair of elections, or indeed that polarisation was significantly greater in 2012 
than it was twenty years earlier. Nevertheless, the trend is clear. The gap between the 
Divisions with the greatest and least Democratic support was 10.69 percentage points in 1992 
(the Mountain Division had the lowest value and New England the highest) and 20.66 points 
in 2012 (between the East South Central and Pacific Divisions). In other words, this is not a 
trendless fluctuation but consistent year on year increase. 
 
At the State scale – where again the number of observations is relatively small (49) 
and the CI spreads fairly large (though much less so than at the Divisional scale) – 
polarisation increased only slowly across the first five of the elections; the increase in the 
MOR between 1992 and 2008 was just eight points, and it then grew by seven points between 
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2008 and 2012. There was only one statistically significant difference, between 1992 and 
2012. At the former of those elections, Democratic support differed by only 25.8 points 
between the lowest (Utah) and highest (Massachusetts) values; at the latter the gap between 
Utah and Hawaii was 46.3 points. 
 
Compared to the situation at those macro-scales, there is no doubt regarding the 
statistical significance of the inter-election differences at the meso-(County) scale. The CI 
spreads in Table 2 indicate no significant difference between the patterns in 1992 and 1996, 
but from then on there is a significant difference between every pair of elections at the 0.05 
probability level or better. Bishop and Cushing’s conclusion is clearly confirmed by this more 
rigorous analysis: the United States’ electorate became spatially more polarised at the County 
scale across those two decades. 
 
Polarisation Between and Within States 
 
The MOR analyses reported in Figure 1 and Table 2 provide clear evidence of 
polarisation of the US electorate during the 1992-2012 period at the County scale. But was 
that trend consistent across all States, or was it greater in some than others? Table 3 gives the 
coefficient of variation (CV) across their constituent Counties (or County equivalents) for 
each State in 1992 and 2012, plus the absolute and relative change in those two values. The 
States are ordered according to the size of the absolute change in their CV values. 
 
The differences across the States are very substantial, from a 30.39 point increase in 
Texas at one extreme to a decrease of 2.96 in Hawaii at the other. All but two of the 49 States 
had increases in their CV, but with clear geographical variations in the extent of the change. 
It was least, on average, in the northeast; none of the New England, Mid-Atlantic and East 
North Central States had a CVChange value exceeding 10.0 (their means were 1.6, 4.3 and 
3.4 respectively), whereas all of the Mountain Division States had a change value exceeding 
12.0 (a mean of 17.1), as also did all States but one in the West South Central Division 
(mean, 18.8: the exception was Oklahoma). Most of the States in the first three groups – 
those with least change – are among those that traditionally give the Democrats greatest 
support (their mean percentages voting Democratic rather than Republican were 57.5, 54.4 
and 53.0 in 1992 and 60.6, 56.9 and 52.9 in 2012); those in the Mountain States on average 
gave least support to the Democrats (47.8 per cent in 1992, 42.2 per cent in 2012), whereas 
those in the West South Central Division shifted most in their support over the two decades 
(52 per cent Democrat on average in 1992 and 1996 but only 39 per cent in 2008 and 2012). 
In general, therefore, it appears that Bishop and Cushing’s conclusion that recent polarisation 
was greater among Republican- than Democratic-supporting areas is borne out. 
 
These changes can be formally modelled (see Appendix 2) by fitting a four-level 
model with Divisions, States, Counties and voters modelled simultaneously, which produces 
MOR values for each spatial unit, net of  the national trend for each year and net of Binomial 
variation. Figure 2 shows those trends at the Divisional scale – i.e. between States within 
Divisions. In 1992, the difference between the largest and the smallest MOR was 0.48 (1.22 
for New England and 0.74 for Mountain); twenty years later, it was 1.19 (1.80 for New 
England and 0.71 for West South Central; the value for the Mountain Division then was 
0.72). There is clear evidence of a divergence – of polarisation as argued by Bishop and 
Cushing – with the MORs for both New England and the Pacific regions increasing 
substantially over the two decades, while those for the East and West South Central regions 
moved substantially in the opposite direction. 
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To explore the significance of that polarisation between Counties within States, a 
separate two-level model was fitted for each State.5 The output from this is subject to a Wald 
test of whether the level of polarisation was greater in 2012 than 1992, using a chi-square test 
of difference in the variances on the logit scale. Table 4 shows the size of those differences, 
with their associated chi-square values and probability levels for each State. The States are 
ordered according to the size of the differences, and they are split into three groups: the 
largest, comprising 29 of the 49 States, are those in which the difference significantly 
widened – i.e. there was significantly greater between-County polarisation in percentage 
voting Democrat within the State over the six elections. There is a second group of 17 States 
where there was no significant trend over time; and finally there were three – geographically 
clustered – States (Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia) where polarisation decreased 
significantly across the six elections. As with the descriptive data in Table 3, therefore, some 
clear geographical patterns emerge. All six New England States are in the group for which 
there was no statistical difference in the degree of polarisation over time, for example. Other 
Divisions are characterised by considerable variation, however, not least East South Central 
which contains not only the two States experiencing the greatest between-County polarisation 
but also two of the three where the trend was in the opposite direction – albeit much less 
pronounced (the differentials for Tennessee and Kentucky were -0.069 and -0.085 
respectively, whereas those for Alabama and Mississippi were 0.552 and 0.495). 
 
Figure 3 shows these MOR values graphically for States that had significant changes 
(p less than or equal to 0.05) over the period 1992-2012. Most States experienced 
significantly increased segregation between the starting and end dates with only three having 
less segregation at the end than at the start. This not only provides clear evidence sustaining 
the argument promoted in The Big Sort but also shows that polarisation was greater in some 
States than others. Thus whereas in 1992 the range of MOR values was between 1.4 and 1.7, 
twenty years later it was 1.4-2.4 – a tripling of the gap between the most (Alabama) and the 
least (West Virginia) polarised states. 
 
Closer examination of the intensity of polarisation within individual States identifies 
very clear differences both between and, in some cases, within the Divisions. The three 
Divisions in the country’s Northeast (East North Central, Mid Atlantic, and New England) 
show very little, if any, change in the levels of within-State polarisation, for example; and the 
three Mid-Atlantic States show only a marginal rise. By way of contrast, all of the States in 
the two western Divisions (Mountain and Pacific) show increased between-county 
polarisation over the six elections. The other four Divisions are characterised by greater 
internal variation, with some States displaying substantially increased polarisation and others 
virtually none. This bifurcation is clearest in East South Central – the MOR values doubled in 
Alabama and Mississippi, but changed hardly at all in Kentucky and Tennessee – but is also 
apparent in the other three: greater polarisation in Texas, for example, compared with 
virtually none in Oklahoma within the West South Central Division; greater polarisation 
within Maryland but none in West Virginia within the South Atlantic Division; and similarly 
within the West North Central Division, greater polarisation in both North and South Dakota 
but very little in Minnesota. Thus in some parts of the USA there has been little, if any, 
polarisation at the within-State County scale (notably in the northeast), whereas in some 
(notably in the west) polarisation has characterised all States, and in the south and the upper 
Great Plains it has been a feature of some States but not others. Spatial polarisation of the US 
electorate has itself been spatially polarised. 
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So Why the Big Sort, and Why More in Some Parts of the USA Than Others? 
 
The rigorous statistical approach to segregation/polarisation adopted here has given 
strong support to the argument advanced in The Big Sort: over the two decades and six 
elections between 1992 and 2012 there has been greater spatial polarisation in the percentage 
voting for the Democratic Party candidates at presidential elections, at all three spatial scales 
analysed.6 Further, as the previous section has stressed, that polarisation has not occurred 
with the same intensity across the nine census Divisions of the United States, across the 
constituent States within each of those Divisions, and across the constituent Counties within 
each of those States. By answering one geographical question, the results have posed more – 
why those variations, at separate scales, within the United States? 
 
Addressing those questions will be the subject of further research. Bishop and 
Cushing (2008) argued that people with different characteristics were clustering together 
more than in the past – and that this is reflected in their electoral behaviour and thus the 
polarisation observed here. Such clustering, their brief ecological analyses suggested, is 
linked to differences across Counties in income levels, educational qualifications, religious 
observance and affiliation, ethnicity, immigration and household structures. If that linkage is 
in any way causal, then there should have been greater spatial polarisation of those – and 
perhaps other – groups over the same period.  
 
Such sorting, if it has occurred, is unlikely to offer a full answer to the greater 
polarisation in voting behaviour. Bishop and Cushing argue that people who cluster together, 
talk together, which leads to what others have identified as ‘conversion by conversation’ 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2001) – an example of the classic neighbourhood effect. Abrams and 
Fiorina (2012) challenged this, arguing that American neighbourhoods are not hotbeds of 
political conversation and that even those who do regularly converse with their neighbours 
rarely or ever discuss politics. And yet there is a very substantial body of research showing 
that the partisan composition of people’s conversation networks can be a powerful influence 
on their political attitudes and voting behaviour (for example, Sunstein, 2009; Hopman et al, 
2015) – so to the extent that such networks are spatially structured (and most people are 
likely to have face-to-face conversations with residents in the same County as themselves) 
then they are likely to contribute to the polarisation trends identified here. The result of such 
processes may well be, as Levendusky (2008, 2009a, 2009b; Levendusky et al., 2008) argues, 
that as local social networks become increasingly dominated by one partisan position – either 
pro-Democrat or pro-Republican – so voters are increasingly less likely to encounter 
alternative viewpoints and to be cross-pressured in the development of their political attitudes 
and voting behaviour, especially when the cues coming from political elites – as between the 
two parties in the US Congress – are also increasingly polarised. As Levendusky (2009b, 13) 
puts it, ‘Microlevel conversion provides the building block for aggregate polarization’. 
 
Further, those spatially-focused conversation networks do not exist outwith any 
external stimuli. Weak ties will link them to other networks, with the potential of new 
influences being introduced (Granovetter, 1973) and in addition political parties and others 
actively seek to influence their attitudes and behaviour (such as Political Action Committees). 
These, too, are increasingly spatially sophisticated in their campaigning strategies, focusing 
most energy and resources on people in areas where they think victory is feasible (Mitchell et 
al., 2015) – and there is plenty of evidence that such intensive campaigning is effective (e.g. 
Brady and Johnston, 2006). Such effective campaigning can accentuate the emerging 
polarisation with, for example, greater turnout among Democratic supporters in Counties 
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where the party campaigns more intensively (more campaigners on the ground; more money 
raised and spent), which are likely to be those Counties where Democratic support is already 
strong. And, as Mellow and Trubowitz (2005) suggest, greater polarisation can have 
important impacts on the country’s governance; as has been apparent during the eight years 
of Barack Obama’s presidency, an increasingly polarised country is reflected in an 
increasingly polarised Congress, which creates increased difficulties for a president – of 
either party – to achieve bipartisan support for substantial policy change. 
 
 There are, therefore, strong alternative hypotheses offering explanations for the spatial 
patterns observed by Bishop and Cushing (2008) and verified through the statistical analyses 
reported here. According to their arguments and qualitative findings, the observed 
polarisation over recent decades has resulted from increasingly-selective migration: people of 
different socio-economic and -demographic types have clustered together to a greater extent 
than previously – a pattern that some analyses of migration patterns and voting behaviour 
have identified (e.g. Cho et al., 2013; McDonald, 2011). A consequence of the aggregation of 
such individual-level behaviour should be greater spatial polarization of those groups that 
Bishop and Cushing identify as central to such migration-stimulated sorting processes – those 
differentiated by income, educational qualifications, religious affiliation and observance, 
ethnicity, immigrant status and household structures. Analyses similar to those reported here, 
using census data, are needed to evaluate whether that is the case.  
 
Even if there is evidence of greater socio-economic and -demographic spatial 
polarization, however, and recent research on one of its components (ethnicity) suggests less 
not greater segregation over recent decades (Glaeser and Vigdor, 2012), this may not offer a 
full explanation for the observed polarization. Instead, social processes operating within the 
more socially-polarized informal and formal networks, encouraged by the geography of 
parties’ campaigning efforts, may result in the increasingly-polarized voting behaviour 
reported here. People do not move to be with people who think and vote like them; instead 
they move to areas where the majority opinion converts them to think and vote like their 
neighbours – a hypothesis that should be central to a research agenda built on the empirical 
foundations established here. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A substantial piece of journalistic investigation suggested a major change to the 
electoral geography of the United States over the last three decades. Several academic 
commentators have dismissed this portrayal, arguing that more rigorous data analyses falsify 
the argument. That position has been in turn rejected here. Using a recently-developed 
statistical procedure for modelling spatial patterns at multiple scales, it has produced strong 
evidence that between 1992 and 2012 there was substantially, and statistically significant, 
greater polarisation in the pattern of voting for the Democratic Party’s presidential candidates 
across the country’s nine Divisions, across the 49 States within those Divisions, and across 
Counties within the States. In terms of voting for president, the United States was more 
polarised in 2012 than it was just two decades earlier – though across the States the 
polarisation was much greater in some than others. That polarisation has been reported here 
at the macro- and meso-spatial scales of Census Division, State and County. Other studies 
have identified similar patterns at micro-scales – within individual Counties and Cities – but 
the absence of comparable data for the entire United States has meant that such local 
patterning could not be incorporated into the present study of national patterns. More 
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investigations at those micro-scales can amplify the macro- and meso-scale patterns so 
clearly demonstrated here. 
 
Whereas some research questions are clearly based in existing theories, building on 
previous research findings, many others are posed by observations – in much human 
geography, for example, by mapped patterns that call for explanations, once the veracity of 
the patterns has been established. The findings reported here with regard to the country’s 
electoral geography fall within that latter category. Statistical analyses have confirmed 
impressionistic accounts of changes to the electoral geography of the United States: there is 
clear evidence of significant spatial polarisation of support for the country’s two main 
political parties across recent presidential elections. This finding raises many important 
questions as to its origin – why has the polarisation occurred? The initial arguments were 
that, as like people tend to vote the same way, and like people tend to cluster together, then 
such clustering increases greater polarisation in voting patterns is the consequence.  But the 
geographical variation uncovered here suggests that a more complex set of processes is in 
operation, setting an agenda for a substantial programme of future research. Not only do we 
need further exploration of why that polarisation has occurred, therefore; research must also 
explore why it is spatially variable, being much more characteristic of some parts of the 
country than others. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The data set deployed here was compiled by Clark Archer, Fred Shelley and Bob Watrell 
largely from information collected from State Election Commission, Secretary of State, or 
other official web sites for each State.  They aggregated township votes to Counties for 
several New England states, combined independent cities and Counties in Virginia, summed 
Liberal and Democratic, and Conservative and Republican votes in New York and some 
other States.  For 1992 and 1996 some of the data came from newspapers or other sources. 
  
Whereas most of the data circulating on the Internet derives from “preliminary” results rather 
than final “certified” results, which are not available for some time after an election 
(December to February) for many States and Counties, and because different States have 
different criteria for “certified” votes, spoiled ballots, etc. exact matches with other sources 
are not very likely, but the differences should not be large. In 2012, for example, the “Final 
Certified” numbers collected through early February 2013 from State Election Commission, 
Secretary of State, etc. web sites showed Obama getting about 2% more votes nationally than 
earlier reports based on “preliminary” tallies of votes published in the New York Times and 
elsewhere shortly after the election. The trends in geographical patterns displayed and 
analysed here are thus unlikely to be contaminated in any way. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
The form of the multilevel model used in the analysis for the County analysis for each State 
(shown in Figure 3)  is as follows – here limited to just three years to save space: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗  ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗, 𝜋𝑖𝑗) 
𝐸(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑖𝑗)) =  𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑥3𝑖𝑗 +  ( 𝑢1𝑗𝑥1𝑖𝑗 +  𝑢2𝑗𝑥2𝑖𝑗 +  𝑢2𝑗𝑥3𝑖𝑗) 
[
𝑢1𝑗
𝑢2𝑗
𝑢3𝑗
] ~ 𝑁 (0,  [
𝜎𝑢1
2
𝜎𝑢1𝑢2
𝜎𝑢1𝑢3
𝜎𝑢2
2
𝜎𝑢2𝑢3𝜎𝑢3
2
] ) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗|𝜋𝑖𝑗) =   
𝜋𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗)
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗
 
 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗 is the observed response variable, the proportion of voters i in 
County j that voted Democrat and 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 is the denominator of the Democrat plus 
Republican voters. The log of the odds of voting Democrat, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝜋𝑖𝑗), is modelled as a 
function of the fixed effects where  𝑥1𝑖𝑗 is a separately coded dummy variable with a 1 for 
1992, 0 otherwise; 𝑥2𝑖𝑗  is a separately coded dummy variable with a 1 for 1996, 0 otherwise 
and so on; and 𝛽1 is the overall logit for the typical  County in 1992 , while 𝛽2 is the  
equivalent for 1996; and so on.  In the random part of the model there is a variance-
covariance matrix at level 2 for Counties. The terms on the main diagonal are the variances  
with 𝜎𝑢1
2  being the variance of the level 2 County departures (𝑢1𝑗),  from the fixed effects in 
1992 and is a measure of the degree of polarization in that year. Similarly 𝜎𝑢2
2  is the variance 
of the County differentials in 1996 (𝑢2𝑗) while 𝜎𝑢1𝑢2 is the covariance of the County 
differentials in 1992 and 1996. At level 1 there is a single variance term and this is assumed 
to follow a Binomial distribution. In this two-level model there is exactly the same set of 
units – the Counties – at level 1 and level 2; that is, each level 2 unit has exactly one level 1 
unit. This views the proportions  at level 2 as consisting of replicated binary responses for 
individuals at level 1. This use of a pseudo-level is fully explained in Brown et al. (2005) and 
allows the separation of the variance into exact Binomial at level 1 and over-dispersion at 
level 2 whose variance is the measure of polarization – the summary of the differences 
between Counties in excess of that expected from a Binomial with a varying denominator. 
The model used for the analysis of Divisions, States and Counties requires two additional 
variance-covariance matrices at the Division and State level.  
 
It is worth stressing that exactly the same results would have been obtained if individual 
binary outcome data with a value 1 for voting Democrat and 0 for Republican had been 
analysed (Subramanian et al., 2001). In short, had we disaggregated the tabulation on which 
the analysis are conducted we could have implemented the same model: however, as there is 
no information lost between the individual row by row version and the tabulation we used, 
we adopted the more efficient (in terms of storage and run-time) modelling of proportions  
strategy Consequently, this multilevel approach transcends the dilemma of the atomistic and 
ecological fallacies (Subramanian et al., 2009) in that we have simultaneously modelled the 
probability of individual voting and the extent to which it varies ecologically from place to 
place. This ecological variation in the individual vote is our measure of segregation and the 
variance at the higher level is calculated net of level 1 ‘individual’ variation. 
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Notes 
1 Of course, some movers have more choice than others because of their income and wealth and ability to 
compete in housing markets. Those with constrained choices are necessarily restricted to certain housing 
market segments only, and increasingly these will be populated by people like themselves. 
2 Ross Perot won 18.9 and 8 per cent of the popular vote respectively in the 1992 and 1996 presidential 
elections. 
3 Other studies (e.g. Reardon et al., 2000; Fischer et al. 2004) have looked at nested patterns of segregation 
using Thiel’s entropy measure of segregation but those applications include no measure of the statistical 
significance of differences over space and/or time, which is an important and original feature of the MOR 
measure deployed here. One frequently criticised aspect of many segregation studies is that they are, in one 
sense, aspatial since they take no account of the relative location of the spatial units analysed – hence work 
introducing spatial autocorrelation measures into segregation studies. The method deployed here does take 
spatial clustering into account, however, as the ratios for smaller units are calculated within the next-level 
units where they are nested (as set out in more detail in Manley et al., 2015a). 
4 On the nature of the data set, see Appendix 1. 
5 There are major differences between States in the number of smaller divisions – South Dakota has just three, 
for example, and Massachusetts 254 – raising potential MAUP issues that will be addressed in further 
research. 
6 Which is not to claim that those are the only scales at which polarisation occurred. They may well have been 
within-County polarisation in at least some Counties – probably mainly those in the country’s metropolitan 
areas. Analysis of these requires finer-grained data than we have available, and which could not be obtained 
for all Counties, requiring separate analyses of different States (as in Myers, 2013). 
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Table 1. Parameters of the distributions of the percentage voting Democrat  
at the 1992-2012 US presidential elections, at the Division, State and County scales 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Coefficient 
    Deviation of Variability 
Division 
1992 47.7 58.4 53.1 3.9 7.3 
1996 47.0 64.7 54.4 5.8 10.7 
2000 41.0 60.3 49.6 7.1 14.3 
2004 39.3 58.6 48.1 7.0 14.5 
2008 41.5 61.8 52.6 7.8 14.8 
2012 39.9 60.6 50.9 8.1 15.9 
State 
1992 36.3 62.1 51.9 6.1 11.7 
1996 38.0 69.0 53.2 7.5 14.1 
2000 28.3 65.7 47.6 8.9 18.7 
2004 26.7 62.7 46.4 8.6 18.5 
2008 33.4 73.0 51.6 9.6 18.6 
2012 25.4 71.7 49.3 10.5 21.2 
County 
1992 10.8 86.5 49.6 11.2 22.6  
1996 11.8 89.3 49.5 11.7 23.6 
2000 6.9 88.0 41.1 12.2 29.7 
2004 7.2 87.2 39.0 12.6 32.3 
2008 5.0 90.0 42.1 14.0 33.2 
2012 3.5 94.0 39.1 14.9 38.1 
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Table 2. The estimated Median Odds Ratios (MORs), with their associated credible intervals 
(CIs),  
for voting Democrat at the 1992-2012 US presidential elections,  
at the Division, State and County scales 
 
 Division State County 
Year LowCI MORHighCI LowCI MORHighCI LowCI MORHighCI 
1992 1.12 1.20 1.34 1.17 1.21 1.27 1.47 1.48 1.50  
1996 1.16 1.27 1.48 1.20 1.25 1.32 1.47 1.49 1.50 
2000 1.22 1.39 1.69 1.22 1.28 1.35 1.51 1.53 1.54 
2004 1.23 1.41 1.75 1.22 1.27 1.34 1.55 1.56 1.58 
2008 1.29 1.51 1.93 1.23 1.29 1.36 1.60 1.62 1.64 
2012 1.30 1.55 2.02 1.29 1.36 1.47 1.69 1.69 1.73 
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Table 3. The coefficients of variation (CVs) for voting Democrat at the 1992 and 2012  
US presidential elections across Counties within States, and changes in those coefficients.  
(The States are ordered according to the absolute value of change between the two elections.) 
 
State Division CV1992 CV2012 CVChange CV%Change 
TX WSC 26.26 56.65 30.39 115.71 
UT MOU 36.97 62.41 25.44 68.83 
AL ESC 23.42 48.63 25.21 107.68 
WY MOU 21.86 45.38 23.51 107.56 
GA SA 17.81 40.99 23.18 130.12 
LA WSC 14.01 36.56 22.56 161.03 
AR WSC 12.22 30.67 18.45 150.94 
KS WNC 22.54 40.38 17.84 79.15 
ND WNC 18.96 36.41 17.45 92.03 
MT MOU 23.19 40.42 17.24 74.34 
MS ESC 23.94 40.01 16.07 67.15 
ID MOU 27.51 42.66 15.15 55.09 
OR PAC 16.23 31.23 15.00 92.39 
AZ MOU 13.25 27.83 14.58 110.11 
NV MOU 20.23 34.69 14.45 71.44 
SD WNC 23.58 37.71 14.13 59.95 
CO MOU 22.46 36.07 13.61 60.58 
FL SA 17.71 31.24 13.53 76.44 
NM MOU 22.47 35.25 12.78 56.87 
DE SA 10.00 22.16 12.16 121.55 
MO WNC 14.35 25.47 11.13 77.57 
MD SA 22.70 33.01 10.31 45.43 
NE WNC 27.49 37.78 10.29 37.44 
IL ENC 14.15 23.33 9.18 64.85 
WA PAC 14.31 23.46 9.15 63.93 
CA PAC 17.65 26.42 8.77 49.72 
NC SA 19.62 27.97 8.35 42.58 
VA SA 18.88 26.03 7.15 37.85 
TN ESC 19.25 26.27 7.02 36.46 
SC SA 20.34 26.11 5.77 28.36 
PA MA 20.97 26.54 5.56 26.52 
NJ MA 16.32 21.42 5.10 31.21 
MA NE 9.50 14.18 4.69 49.32 
OK WSC 24.28 28.22 3.94 16.22 
KY ESC 23.56 27.36 3.80 16.14 
MN WNC 11.39 15.01 3.62 31.78 
WI ENC 14.40 17.78 3.39 23.51 
IA WNC 14.80 17.77 2.97 20.04 
ME NE 5.12 7.60 2.48 48.44 
NY MA 18.82 21.12 2.29 12.18 
OH ENC 20.96 22.88 1.92 9.16 
IN ENC 19.67 21.27 1.60 8.15 
WV SA 18.03 19.47 1.45 8.02 
RI NE 4.32 5.70 1.38 31.95 
MI ENC 13.83 14.96 1.13 8.17 
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NH NE 9.34 10.39 1.04 11.17 
VT NE 7.31 7.91 .61 8.29 
CT NE 8.18 7.86 -.32 -3.94 
HI PAC 6.97 4.02 -2.96 -42.41 
Key to Divisions: NE – New England; MA – Mid-Atlantic; SA- South Atlantic; ENC – East 
North Central; WNC – West North Central; ESC – East South Central; WSC – West South 
Central; MOU – Mountain; PAC – Pacific. 
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Table 4. The modelled differences in the changing variances over time across Counties 
within States,  
with their associated chi-square values and probabilities of differing significantly from zero.  
(The States are ordered according to the size of those modelled differences.) 
 
StateDivision Diff Chi p StateDivision Diff Chi p  
AL ESC 0.552 19.4 0.00 IL ENC 0.075 6.7 0.01 
MS ESC 0.495 27.5 0.00 NJ MA 0.209 6.3 0.01 
TX WSC 0.361 44.9 0.00 WY MOU 0.267 4.3 0.04 
GA SA 0.357 41.5 0.00 IO WNC 0.029 4.2 0.04 
LA WSC 0.339 18.7 0.00 AZ MOU 0.279 3.2 0.07 
CO MOU 0.297 17.4 0.00 UT MOU 0.254 2.1 0.15 
SD WNC 0.297 18.4 0.00 NE MOU 0.247 2.7 0.10 
ND WNC 0.280 15.4 0.00 DE SA 1.324 0.0 0.87 
CA PAC 0.238 18.3 0.00 PA MA 0.063 1.8 0.18 
FL SA 0.203 13.7 0.00 VT NE 0.038 1.1 0.30 
LS WSC 0.141 16.8 0.00 MA NE 0.032 0.4 0.53 
NY MA 0.126 13.8 0.00 RI NE 0.032 0.2 0.69 
NM MOU 0.400 11.0 0.00 NH NE 0.029 0.3 0.58 
OR PAC 0.265 11.7 0.00 ME NE 0.024 0.4 0.53 
MT MOU 0.228 11.9 0.00 MN WNC 0.023 3.1 0.08  
AK WSC 0.130 11.5 0.00 OH ENC 0.032 0.2 0.66 
NC SA 0.108 10.8 0.00 CT NE 0.002 0.0 0.96 
NE MOU 0.106 12.1 0.00 MI ENC -0.004 0.1 0.82 
WA PAC 0.135 8.7 0.00 IN ENC -0.013 0.4 0.53 
MD SA 0.495 8.1 0.01 HI PAC -0.038 0.0 0.92 
VA SA 0.107 7.8 0.01 OK WSC -0.079 3.1 0.08 
ID MOU 0.236 7.1 0.01 TN ESC -0.069 4.2 0.04 
SC SA 0.132 6.9 0.01 KY ESC -0.085 4.9 0.03 
WI ENC 0.062 7.1 0.01 WV SA -0.112 6.2 0.01 
MO WNC 0.051 6.9 0.01     . 
Key to Divisions: NE – New England; MA – Mid-Atlantic; SA- South Atlantic; ENC – East 
North Central; WNC – West North Central; ESC – East South Central; WSC – West South 
Central; MOU – Mountain; PAC – Pacific. 
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Captions 
 
Figure 1. The modelled MOR values for the polarisation of voting for the Democratic party’s 
presidential candidates, 1992-2012, with their associated CIs, by Division (left), by State 
within Division (centre), and by County within State within Division (right). 
 
Figure 2. Differences from the national trend by Division. 
Figure 3. The MORs for between-County polarisation in voting for the Democratic party’s 
presidential candidates, 1992-2012: each State modelled separately. 
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Figure 1. The modelled MOR values for the polarisation of voting for the Democratic party’s 
presidential candidates, 1992-2012, with their associated CIs, by Division (left), by State 
within Division (centre), and by County within State within Division (right). 
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Figure 2. Differences from the national trend by Division. 
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Figure 3. The MORs for between County polarisation in voting for the Democratic party’s 
presidential candidates, 1992-2012: each State modelled separately 
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